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5izor decades. macroeconomists have us-
~fn tened to criticism from their professional
I colleagues about the absence of micro-
foundations from most ofwhat they say and
do. A typical comment is: “I don’t understand
much about macroeconomics; how is it relat-
ed to economics?” A possibly less-frivolous
comment is that nothing can be said about
macroeconomic policy until economists
develop a macroeconomic theory from a
microeconomic foundation. Anything less is
branded “ad hoc” and dismissed.
Much of the work in macroeconomics of
the past two decades has responded to these
criticisms by attempting to build macroeco-
nomics on an explicit micro-foundation.
That is aworthwhile goal hut it opens the
question: Which foundation should that be?
The current generation ofacademic
researchers are as divided about theappro-
priate analytic model as their predecessors.
Analytic paradigms now include multiple
equilibrium, real business cycle, neo-
Keynesian, monetary-rational expectations,
and eclectic models. Most have amicro-
foundation, hut it is not the same foundation.
I do not question the presumption that a
micro-foundation is useful. At issue is what
the foundation should be. Iquestion the
relevance for monetary and macroeconomics
of micro-foundations which feature a repre-
sentative agent who trades on a complete set
ofArrow-Debreu markets. Despite some
limited successes, it is time to question
whether this now widely accepted approach
is likely to be fruitful and to suggest why I
believe its success will be limited. Success
is relative, of course. Real business cycle
theory has developed an explicit analysis of
the transmission ofproductivity and terms of
trade shocks. These shocks, though widely
recognized earlier, had not been made the
subject of an explicit model. Neo-Keynesians
and others have produced some suggestions
about pricing. Overlapping-generations
models ofmoney, intertemporal substitution
theories of unemployment, and productivity
shock theories of the business cycle have not
proved fruitful. Thesemodels have not pro-
duced either an accepted foundation for
macro theory or averified theory of aggregate
output, prices and interest rates. Perhaps
theywill in the future, but the results to date
are not promising.
There are two main ways to tie micro
and macro theories. The first is aggregation.
Aggregation is an important and much
neglected issue, but it is not my main theme.
Most current or recent research dispenses
with the aggregation problem by assuming a
representative individual. Here the old and
new macroeconomics are equally deficient
and open to charges of “arm waving” and “ad
hocery” The representative individual is a
usefulworking assumption for some purpos-
es, but the representative individual discards
animportant difference between markets
and individuals.
The second problem is the specific
micro-foundation used for macro theory
Most ofmy discussion is directed there. Id o
not attempt to survey a large literature on
micro theory uncertainty and industrial orga-
nization. The implications of some of this
literature for price stickiness is ably summa-
rized in Gordon (i990). This paper is a
personal statement, reflectingjoint work
as noted earlier.
The problemwith existing micro-foun-
dations that I emphasize is the neglect of
costs of information. In Walrasian micro-
foundations, all trades take place at market
clearing prices, and there is no cost of
acquiring information. An auctioneer calls
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out the prices at zero cost and does not close
transactions until all transactors are at an
equilibrium. There is a numeraire, but there
is no way for money to disturb the real value
of production or purchases. Non-neutrality
cannot arise. Attempts to graft a monetary
disturbance onto these micro-foundations
seem misdirected.
The hypothesis that all observed prices
are market clearing prices does not imply
that all individuals, behaving rationally,
know those prices and fully adjust to them.
Information is costly to acquire; time and
resources must be used to collect, process
and interpret—the latter especially—new
data. Even in markets dominated by price
takers, there are differences between the
information processed and known to arbi-
tragers and specialists andwhat is known to
non-specialists. The representative individ-
ual paradigm ignores this distinction.
One way to proceed is by aggregating
heterogenous individuals who face different
costs ofacquiring infonnation, and much new
work has taken this path. As Gordon (1990)
emphasizes, atany time there are many differ-
ent layers of pricing and output included
in aggregate prices and output—suppliers,
suppliers of suppliers, foreign producers, and
so on. Instead oftrying to aggregate over
these many, diverse and changing levels of
decisions, it may prove more useful to treat
them as part of a stochastic process.
One of the problemswith the hypothesis
that “sticky” prices reflect decisions at differ-
ent levels ofaggregation comes out clearly
in Gordon’s paper. He argues that sluggish
price adjustment reflects marginal cost pric-
ing. “[Agentsl care about the relation of
their own price to their own costs, not to
aggregate nominal demand. Unless a single
agent believes that the actions ofall other
agents will make its marginal costs mimic
the behavior ofnominal demand with mini-
mal lags, the aggregate price level cannot
mimic nominal demand, and Keynesian
output fluctuations result.”
This argument has a perverse implication.
Farmers or farms that operate in commodity
markets with many competitors should he
slowest to adjust to aggregate demand
shocks. Yet commodity prices typically
adjust quickly Large industrial firms—
General Motors, Mitsubishi—know that they
are a relatively large part of the economy, so
they should adjust to aggregate demand
more promptly than commodity producers.
Typically, they do not.
Missing from Gordon’s analysis is the
difference in information and in costs of
acquiring information. Commodities are
traded on open markets, so prices promptly
reflect changes in the factors affecting
demand and supply Prices ofautos, steel,
heavy industrial products and consumer
durables are not set in organized markets.
Information on which tobase prices is
more uncertain.
As Keynes recognized, a principal miss-
ing element is uncertainty about the future.
Uncertainty and its twin, costs of informa-
tion, make it rational for some firms to
adjust prices slowly Prices may be “sticky”
as economists have observed for about as
long as there has been a discipline.
Some economistswill scoff that sticky
prices are irrational or equivalentto leaving
five, 50 or 500 dollar bills in the street.
This is an error arising from dependence on
Walrasian foundationsand neglect of infor-
mation costs. Yet, there is nothing novel
about invoking costs ofacquiring information
to explain sluggish price adjusunent or
sticky prices. The positive slope of Lucas’
(1972) aggregate supply curve arises from
confusionbetween relative and absolute
price changes; prices in that model do not
immediately adjust to new information. The
cost oflearning whether a change in demand
is an aggregate or relative change is infinite
for one period and zero thereafter. In the
neo-Keynesian models discussed in Ball and
Mankiw (1994), costs of price adjustment—
so-called menu costs—and “real rigidities”
are assumed to be present. The authors
accept that one of the principal costs ofprice
adjustment is the cost ofacquiring informa-
tion relevant for a decision about how much
to change price.
Given this widespread acceptance of
information or transaction costs, what
remains to be done? Lucas’ (1972) model
implies more rapid adjustment of prices and
output to new information than we observe
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in practice. Could it be rational to adjust
more slowly thanin one week or month?
Is the compelhng fact that data on the price
level are released monthly? Or is this infor-
mation subject to error so that it takes longer
to disseminate, interpret and act on these
data? Neo-Keynesian models build on the
model ofan imperfectly competitive firm,
with strong implications for profits and
excess capacity that do not find empirical
support at the micro level. If monopolistic
elements and menu costs are the source of
stickyprices, there are testable implications
for the profits ofdifferent types offirms; there
is a significant problem ofreconciling contin-
uous excess capacity with rational behavior
Further, as Gordon (1990) has noted, costs
of adjusting output are neglected in these
models. Yet these costs may be larger for
many firms thancosts ofprice adjustment.
My principal criticism of both neo-
classical and neo-Keynesian approaches is
that they seek to explain why firms delay
using available information. By putting the
issue in that framework, they neglect the
uncertainty that surrounds much ofthe
aggregate and disaggregated data. This paper
uses several strands of earlier work to explain
rational price setting and gradual adjustment
as a response to uncertainty about what cur-
rent information implies. Information is
costly to acquire and to interpret as in
Brunner and Meltzer (1971) or Alchian
(1977). As in Bomhoff (1983), a principal
difficulty in interpreting information is
uncertainty about howlong changes will
persist. This is the central idea developed
in Brunner, Cukierman and Meltzer (1983),
but we took the idea from Muth’s (1961)
seminal paper on rational expectations. In
Meltzer (1982), 1 used these ideas to discuss
price setting.
There are three separable aspects ofpric-
ing to consider. First, (some) prices are set
by firms. Second, firms choose nominal
values; they do not indexor set a relative
price. Third, prices that are set change less
frequently than prices in auction markets.
Each aspect is important for macroeco-
nomics. If some prices were not fixed in
nominal value for at least one period, relative
prices would be invariant to a monetary
change. Delays in recognizing permanent
changes in money or its growth rate would
affect only real balances. At best, we would
be forced to fall back on the real balance
effect in consumption to explain short-term
real effects of changes in money A rational
reason for setting some, but not all, nominal
prices permits a more direct effect through
inventory adjustment. Firms that hold
inventories can both anticipate future price
changes and buffer current transitory price
changes by varying inventories. Because
some prices are determined in auction mar-
kets, price setting introduces different speeds
of adjustment and relative price changes.
My extensive work with Brunner emphasized
the relative prices of assets and output.
This introduces the difference between the
replacement cost, or the cost of current
production, and the market price ofexisting
assets. Asset prices adjust more rapidly than
output prices particularly for assets that
trade in organized markets. Hence, informa-
tion costs (and transaction costs) are implicit
in that framework as an explanation of
changes in relative prices. My emphasis
here is on information as in Brunner,
Cukierman and Meltzer (1983). Relative
price changes in response to nominal shocks
are part of that story, but they remain in
the background.
kJ ~ At!’ •PRICES?
Postwar recessions typically last about
nine months on average. Costs ofinforma-
tion or other explanations of sluggish adjust-
ment must be able to explain this timing,
and estimates of price stickiness should be
consistent with data on cyclical fluctuations.
I digress therefore to consider a recent
attempt to measure stickiness. Blinder
(1991) reports preliminary findings from a
survey of pricing decisions by managers of a
random sample of corporations with annual
sales of $10 million located in the northeast-
ern United States. Blinder’s survey produced
two very different sets ofestimates.
First, Blinder reports the answer to a
question about how frequently a finn
changes its price. He finds that the median
firm changes price about once a year. Nearly
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They find effects of sonic of these
etemerts on price dispersior.
40 percent of the firms were at the median.
More than one-sixth of the firms changed
prices less frequently than once a year, so 55
percent of the prices change no more than
once a year.
Second, Blinder also reports the respon-
dents’ estimate of the mean lag ofactual
prices behind increases and decreases in
demand and cost. There is considerable
uniformity in these responses. The mean lag
for increases or decreases in demand and
cost is three to lour months.
The second set ofdata suggest consider-
able uniformity ofresponse to the four shocks.
There is little evidence ofthe asymmetric
adjustment associated with Keynesian down-
ward price inflexibility The data also sug-
gest an inconsistency that Blinder does not
mention. How do we reconcile a mean delay
ofthree to four months in response to changes
in demand and cost with the report that 76
percent of the sample changes price no more
than twice a year and, as noted, 55 percent
changes price no more than once a year?
Are demand and cost changes infrequent?
It is difficult to reconcile the assumption that
costs change infrequently with evidence
showing that commodity prices and other
open market prices change daily and typically
fall in recessions and rise in expansions.
Bhnder did not ask whether firms adjust
their prices fully in response to changes in
demand and cost. They may adjust partially,
asimplied by rational behavior under uncer-
tainty about the persistence or permanence
ofannounced changes, or they may antici-
pate future changes and adjust prices more
than current changes in cost or demand.
One way to reconcile the different responses
is to assume that respondents answer the
two questions in different ways. Suppose
they treat price as a scalar when asked about
the frequency of price changes but include in
price adjustment more thanjust price setting.
On this interpretation, quoted prices are one
component of a vector ofterms and conditions
relevant to sellers and buyers. The theoretical
term price used in economics typicallysub-
suanes delivery time, discounts, advertising
allowances, volume rebates, payment terms
and other conditions used to adjust thebuyer’s
cost and the seller’s net receipts. Blinder’s
early results confirm that delivery lags
and service are moderately important for
65 percent of the firms in his sample; he
reports delivery lags and service are the most
commonly cited reason forprice stickiness.’
Delivery lags and service are one way of
adjusting the theoretical term “price” while
leaving the quoted price unchanged.
Assume that firms initially respond to
changes in cost and demand by adjusting
deliveries, advertising allowances, discounts,
and so on while leaving quoted prices
unchanged for several months or longer. If
managers are uncertain about the duration of
changes in demand or cost, they can change
other components of the price vector to test
the market’s response. By changingdehveiy
tenns, or offering or removing discounts,
firms can change their revenues or the
buyers cost without changing the quoted
price. This pricing model can be used to
rationalize the familiar Keynesian supply
curve—a reverse L—when quoted prices are
distinguished from other terms in the price
vector. Equally the model can explain the
difference in response to the questions in
Blinder’s survey
Figure 1 shows the initial response to an
increase in demand. On the left, the quoted
price (p) does not respond to a perceived
change in demand when output is below
capacity; the firm (or industry) increases
output (q) with little or no change in quoted
price. On the right, the price vector (p),
includes other dimensions ol the firm’s price;
supply is drawn as a positively sloped linear
function. An increase in perceived demand
from d© to d, induces the firm to reduce
advertising allowances, retnove discounts,
or change some other component of the
price vector, so (p) increases.
If the firm’s initial response reflects
uncertainty about the persistence of
increased demand, the response changes as
information accrues. An increase in the
quoted price may substitute for or supple-
ment other components of the price vector.
As perception of the magnitude of the per-
manent increase becomes clearer, the firm
may recognize that the new demand curve is
at, or to the right of, d,. Or the firm may
raise p, with p unchanged.
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We need not explore the many possibili-
ties. The main point is that uncertainty about
the degree of persistence and the use of a
pricevector permit this hypothesis to account
forvery different responses within a rational
expectations framework. In particular, the
firm’s revenues may respond instantly to
increases in demand, but quoted prices may
adjust with a long lag, as Blinder found.
The reasoning is symmetric. Perceived reduc-
tions in demand may induce firmsto offer
discounts and allowances with p unchanged.
As information accnoes and perceptions
change, the actual price, p, is reduced.
The Keynesian supply function doesnot
work for changes in cost if the demand curve
is not kinked. Changes in cost shift the
supply curve, so prices change instantly
whether the supply has a reverse L-shape or
is monotonically increasing. Since Blinder’s
survey finds that price responds about as
promptly to changes in cost as to changes in
demand, this evidence rejects the Keynesian
supply curve.1
The distinction between price as a vector
and a scalar does not reconcile the differences
in timing reported in the survey Although I
believe that prices, terms and conditions
change at different rates when there is uncer-
tainty about the persistence ofthe market
conditions inducing firms to change prices,
those differences are neglected hereafter.
Price stickiness will mean that it takes about
three or four months on average for prices to
respond to demand and cost changes. The
three-to-foter month delay that Blinder reports
includes at least one quarterly reportingperiod
at which managements announce earnings
and sales and, most importantly observe
reported earnings, inventories and sales of
competing firms.3 Knowledge of competitors’
results helps the firm to supplement trade
gossip and other informal data sources to
decide whether a persistent change in market
demand (orindustry costs) has occurred.
INFORMATION AND PRICE
SMITING
Anyone familiar with hterature on the
behavior of firms knows that there are many
rational reasons for firms to set prices. This
p p
section discusses one reason that is rather
general and can be incorporated readily
into macroeconomics. Price setting is
considered as a response to uncertainty or
costs of acquiring information about the
market clearingprice by at least one (large)
group of market participants. At times,
prices convey information known to the
sellerhut not to the buyer. At times,
neither the buyer nor the seller is certain
about the market clearing price. Among
the possible reasons on the cost and demand
sides, this section emphasizes rational
reasons why buyers and sellers do not
instantly know the permanence of changes
in demand. They develop contracts and
market arrangements to deal with
this uncertainty.
This approach differs from the literature
on so-called menu costs, The menu costlit-
erature emphasizes costs ofchanging prices.5
These costs are recognized as relativelysmall
(Ball and Mankiw, 1994). Moreover, the menu
cost model does not explain why sellers face
different costs and adjust at different speeds.
I do not challenge the existence of menu costs,
but the emphasis here is on uncertainty and
information costs—the cost oflearning about
current and prospective market conditions.
Information costs differ by firm and industry.
They depend on the way in which markets
are organized and the types ofcontracts
that emerge to reduce costs of uncertainty
information and moral hazard.
5”
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Frank Knight was an early expositor of
the economics of information. Knight (1933),
argued that decisions about how much
and when to produce require a pooling of
information about individual decisions to
purchase. When aggregated, the individual
decisions constitute a demand curve.
Firmsreduce uncertainty for consumers
by pooling information. In principle, indi-
viduals can contract in advance for the goods
and services that they want. Organizing
retail firms that pool information isan efficient
alternative to futures contracts if individuals
are less certain about the magnitude and tim-
ing of theirpurchases than firms are about
marketdemand. Knight appeals to the law
oflarge numbers to explain finns’ advantage.
He compares pooling by firms to insurance
and concludes that the two differ in an
important way; a firm’s pricing and output
decisionsare non-insurable because they
require more subjective judgment, and errors
are less likely to cancel across firms.
In Knight’s view, firms produce for inven-
tory using pooled information about expected
demand. This arrangement shifts uncertainty
from individuals to firms and, by pooling,
reduces the social cost of bearing uncertainty
Knight’s argument is one ofseveral that
links information costs and uncertainty to
price setting. A non-uniform distribution of
information is critical for these arguments.
In an auction market, all market participants
must have information about the qualities
of the goods traded and their prices. In the
standard Walrasian model, this is accom-
plished by: (I) assuming the presence of
an auctioneer who calls out the prices;
(2) allowing recontracting; and (3) letting all
trades be made simultaneously These assump-
tions are necessary for equilibrium. They leave
no role for monetary disturbances.
The necessary conditions are frequently
violated in practice. Some people have a
comparative advantage in acquiring informa-
tion. Some receive information about market
conditions as a by-product of other activity
Forexample, in securities markets, there are
brokers, dealers and market makerswho
acquire specialized information in the course
oftrading. Assembling all or a sufficiently
large numnber ofmarket participants also
imposessevere constraints. Formany reasons,
including the law of large numbers, people
choose different times for their market
activities. The commitment to assemble at
pre-specified thmes for all marketing purposes
is costly, if not impossible. Theuse of an
agent introduces costs of monitoring
and supervision.
In practice, markets operate in many
differentways. One alternative commonly
found in oriental countries is called a bazaar.
Prices are notposted, and there is no auctioneer
mechanism. Buyers and sellers negotiate
(haggle) until a transaction is completed or the
negotiation terminates. Considering a bazaar
brings out the importance ofinformation.
The bazaar requires an investment of
time by transactors. Where the auction
market requires simultaneous arrival ofall
participants or their agents, the bazaar
depends on a trickle of arrivals. It cannot
cope with large groups arriving simultane-
ously because each negotiation isseparate.
It is not surprising that the bazaar is found
in comparatively simple, low-income
economies. In these circumstances, the
allocation of time to the bargaining process
mnay he partly a constemption good. With
rising opportunity costs of time, the disad-
vantages of the bargaining process exceed
the benefits.
The working of a bazaar restricts its
application. There are severe limits on the
number of transactions per period. Sellers
cannot serve several customers simultane-
ously Delegating bargaining to employees
poses both an incentive and a moral hazard
problem. Buyers incur costs to learn about
reservation prices, since information is
revealedonly by commitments to transact
firm offers to buy or sell. An accepted offer
to purchase may be above the seller’s reserva-
tion price; a refusal to sell maybe based on
an incorrect inference that the buyer is willing
to pay more. Learning the reservation price
and negotiating the market price often requires
a series ofoffers. There is no certainty that
the reservation price is revealed. Subsequent
transactors on one side of the market do not
know the history of past transactions. They
must invest their own time.
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not observed, An unexpectedly
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natal same of these contracts.
relocate or search for a particular input at an
inconvenient time.
Labor Mo.rtrers
The conditions leading to price setting
also apply to the labor market. The terms
negotiated and the time horizon built into an
agreement depend on the assessments of the
parties. There are no organized futures mar-
kets for labor. Both parties use all available
information to form their uncertain assess-
ments. An assessment of the market is a
(subjective) probability distribution. The
more diffuse the distribution, the shorter the
time covered by the arrangement.
Realizations often deviate from the
expectations implied by the subjective prob-
ability distributions. Both parties have to
infer from realizations whether the unexpected
changes are transitory or permanent.
A transitory change does not change
the expected value, so the unanticipated
gains and losses do not change the informa-
tion on which the agreement was based.
Either party may believe that a costless
revision ofthe bargain to adjust to a transitory
change would be beneficial, but attempts at
revision for each such change raise the cost
of transacting and eliminate the benefits of a
longer-term agreement.
A more permanent change in conditions
poses a different problem. The initial assess-
ment of at least one party must he revised in
the light of the new information. If the stakes
are sufficiently high, the permanent change
mayjustify the cost ofrenegotiation.
Negotiations proceed more smoothly
when both parties share the reassessment of
market conditions. Differences in assessment
provide evidence on the extent ofuncertainty
Strikes and lockouts increase with differences
in assessment, for example, at the start of a
period ofinflation or disinflation, if both
parthes could agree on the actual shocks that
occurred in the past and on how long they
will persist, they could contract in advance
to compensate for unanticipated changes
after they occur. Permanent changes in
nominal values would not be allowed to affect
real wages. Permanent changes in produc-
tivity would he paid to workers if positive
and by workers if negative. That we do not
observe contracts of this kind suggests that
assessments differ even after the event and
that reaching a common assessment of the
past is costly Of course, setting nominal
wages is not costless either. Bargaining or
negotiating to correct for unforeseen events
can be costly, privately and socially if there
are strikes or layoffs.°
Differences in information can explain
price setting, but they do not fully explain
why firms and employees often set nominal
wages or prices. There mustbe some addi-
tional cost ofsetting relative prices or benefit
from setting nominal wages (or prices). One
explanation is that the parties do not agree
on the interpretation of real wages and, par-
ticularly at low rates ofinflation, have diffi-
culty agreeing on an appropriate index.
There are two different meanings of real
wages. One meaning expresses real wages in
terms of the product of the firm at which the
worker is employed. The second refers to the
basket of goods and services that the worker
can purchase. The problems of setting con-
tract terms differ in the two cases.
Contracts that set wages in relation to
productivity require a satisfactory solution
to the measurement of productivity Where
precise measurement is difficult, asin service
industries or managerial tasks, real wage
contracts are difficult to write. Even
when productivity is measured reliably as
in piece-work systems, the measure does
not translate directly into a real wage
rate. Valuation is required; often some
(more or less) arbitrary system must be used
to impute the price ofthe final product to
the various inputs. Imputation and valuation
bring tcvo additional problems. One is moral
hazard; the employer has some incentive to
adopt a cost accounting systeen that benefits
him. The other is the difference between
relative and absolute prices. The employer is
mainly concerned with the relation of wages
to product prices. The employee is concerned
also, and perhaps most, about the relation of
wages to the price of consumables—the sec-
ond meaning of real wages. A frequent
compromise in periods ofinflation is partial
indexation to the price of consumables.
Real wage setting with full indexation
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A seller who posts prices reduces the
buyers’ costs of acquiring information about
prices. Buyers’ costs of comparing prices by
different sellers are reduced. The social
advantage of price setting is greatest where
one party to the transaction has more infor-
mation about market conditions. Some
examples illustrate this argument.
information about prices conveys more
thanjust purchase cost. Posted prices can
also reduce costs ofacquiring information
about quality For example, a restaurant
owner must decide on the market he wants
to serve. This decision influences the kind
and quality offood served, the services offered,
and the prices charged. By posting prices, the
owner informs the buyer about his choices.
Although the buyer must sample tojudge
quality the correlation between quality and
price helps the buyer to decide whether to
sample. A policy of frequently changing
prices reduces information and places the
restaurant at a competitive disadvantage.
The organization of the diamond market
provides additional evidence on the role of
information in market organization. The
wholesale diamond market is an auction
market dominated by buyers and sellers who
are specialists. Traders rely on their own
skill in judging quahty knowledge of prices
and other attributes. The retail market is
very different. ‘[he sellers are mainly special-
ists; the buyers typically have much less
information than the sellers. By posting
prices, sellers exploit the correlation between
quality and price to inform bteyers. Buyers
find it less costly to invest in information
about the seller than to invest in information
about the quality of diamonds, so sellers use
resources to build reputation. If costs of
acquiring information about the quality of
diamonds were to fall to a minimal value,
these arrangements would change. Diamonds
might he sold in supermarkets or in retail
aucthon markets.
Price setting is valued by transactors even
in some auction markets. In well-organized
auction markets, we find people willing to
pay for the right to purchase or sell atfixed
nominal prices. The contracts expressing
these rights, known as “put” and “call”
options, give the owner the right to buy or
sell at a fixed price within a fixed time period.
The prices of the puts and calls are determined
in auction markets. The priceof these options
is the costthat people pay for the right to trade
in the future at prices fixed today Similarly
in commodity markets, hedgers pay to
change uncertain future prices into known
values. They pay a fee for the right to buy or
sell at fixed nominal prices. In such markets,
information about current and currently
anticipated future prices is available. The fee
permits transactors to avoid uncertain future
price changes.
Costs ofinformation and transactions
are not uniform across goods, so no single
form ofmarket organization dominates all
others. The specific reasons transactors are
willing to pay for puts and calls differ from
the reason for price setting in the diamond
market, just as the diamond market differs
from the restaurant. Each is related, however,
to costs of information. The organization
of the diamond market reduces the costs of
bearing uncertainty about quality The market
for puts and calls permits asset owners or
speculators to limit risk of wealth changes.
And there are other market arrangements
where price setting is useful. Catalogues
must post prices. Cotitracts fix prices for a
year or more on housing rentals, magazine
subscriptions, and automobile leases.
These many different examples suggest
that there are advantages in different types
of contracts.
The examples suggest a way to model
price setting formally. The seller has infor-
mation that is costly for the buyer to acquire.
The seller internalizes the cost of acquiring
the information; it is part of his specialized
knowledge and he revises his information in
the process of buying inputs. By posting a
price, he exploits the correlation between price
and quality In goods markets, the sellermay
offer a particular type ofput—an option for
the buyer to return the merchandise if the
quality is not as represented or, perhaps, if the
buyer finds the same merchandise at a lower
price. The buyer pays for the good and for
the put, but the purchase cost is lower than
under alternative forms oforganization. In
service markets, the buyer may purchase
increased certainty that he will not have to
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is rare. This suggests that at low levels of
inflation, buyers and sefiers prefer cx post
adjustment through negotiation to reliance
on an imprecise or imperfect index. As infla-
tion increases, costs ofnon-indexation rise
relative to costs ofindexation. Moreparties
choose a mixed strategy of partial indexation.
Experience in Israel and Brazil suggests that
at relatively high rates of inflation, indexation
is nearly, but never fully complete. There is
always some lagin adjustment. Data for
countries with high inflation also suggest
that workers willingly forego indexation if
offered relatively stable prices.
The choice of an indexis a problem for
both parties. Some of the problem would
be removed if shocks could be identified
unambiguously, if one-time price changes
(transitory changes in the rate of inflation)
could be separated from permanent changes
in inflation, or if all shocks were of one
kind—for example, permanent, nominal
or real aggregative, or real allocathve. The
absence ofreliable information prevents settle-
ment on an optimal indexation formula.
Nominal wage contracting is also not
ideal. Different types of contracts are used to
adjust nominal wages for inflation. Inperiods
of low or moderate inflation, we observe
contracts that differ in duration, in the extent
of formal indexation,and in the use of clauses
permitting reopening of the wage agreement
during the life ofthe contract. We observe
also that the types of contracts change with
the rate of inflation and that employers can
be induced to compensate for (some) past
price changes when (non-indexed) contracts
are renewed. At high rates of inflation, firms
and other market participants monitor the
rate ofinflation. Costs that were previously
marginal costs ofinformation became fixed
or quasi-fixed costs of information. Nominal
prices adjust more frequently
Retail store leases differ from wage
contracts. Leases are often indexed to the
volume ofsales. Sales are more easily
monitored and therefore less subject to moral
hazard. Valuation is based on receipts, so
measurement is not as much of a problem as
for profits or productivity Both parties have
an interest in maintaining the property
Bond contracts provide another example
of the problem of choosing an index. Private
parties do not issue price-level hnked bonds.
Under the gold standard, however, firms
offered to pay in gold. Buyers and sellers
could agree on this index oflong-term value.
Once this common measure, related to the
value ofmoney became less relevant, indexed
bonds were rare. Inability to agree on an
index left no agreement. In Britain, Israel,
Brazil and a few other countries, the govern-
ment resolved this problem by issuing an
indexed bond.
Comparison of the choices made in
markets for labor, rental property and bonds
suggests that agreement on an index is most
difficult when prices can change because of
real and nominal shocks, and changes can be
permanent or transitory. This should not
suggest that non-indexation is optimal.
Contracting parties find many differentsolu-
tions but, as experience in labor markets
shows, full indexation is rare.
A StylizedModel
In several papers, I have used a model of
permanent and transitory changes based on
Bomhoff (1983) to study the frequency of
shocks and their interaction. A main conclu-
sion of this work is that there is no reason to
expect constancy or even repetition in the
frequency distribution ofshocks. The public
cannot use data from the past to anticipate
the future relative frequency of permanent
and transitory shocks or real and nominal
shocks. These frequencies change with public
policy decisions, policy rules at home and
abroad, weather, inventions or innovations,
changes in marketstructure, and other factors
affecting an economy’s structural relations.
The model has three types of shocks:
transitory shocks to the level; permanent
shocks tothe level (which are transitory
shocks to the growth rate); and permanent
shocks to the growth rate. Letxr be the current
value of real output and Pr the current value
ofthe price level. Both prices and output can










Pr = +Z r
There are stochastic elements in the growth
paths of output and inflation in addition to
transitory and permanent changes in the levels
ofoutput and prices. Much confusion in the
discussion of inflation has been caused by
the use of “inflation” to refer both to level
changes such as oil shocks (distributed over
time) and persistent changes in the maintained
rate of change.
Suppose we now introduce a common
type ofPhillips relation between p andx in
the neighborhood of Pc = 1.0.
xa- kr = a(pr - Pa.)
Theway in which prices will change over time
depends on the permanence of the shocks.
It takes time for agents to learn whether
the shocks change a,, v, or Z, and, from the
simultaneity ofx and p, shocks to ~, y~ and
Pa’ The path bywhich prices adjust—or the
degree to which they are sticky—depends on
the nature ofthe shocks. It is entirely ratio-
nal in this framework for prices to be sticky
and for the speed of adjustment to differ
from one episode to another,
The model in Brunner, Cukierman and
Meltzer (1983) conveys some of the ideas
just discussed. The main idea of the model
can be written in a general way Consider
the following system of simultaneous equa-
tions for a macroeconomic system. In the
underlying micro model, firms set price at
the start of the period and hold inventories.
Shocks are revealed after production decisions
are made.
(1) .IIY,. P,~ Ma, ~ai, ~r’ r,, -‘c, ma] 0,
where y = output, p = price level, h = stock
of inventories, i = nominal interest rate,
r = real interest rate, x = exogenous real
shock, and m = nominal money stock. Under
full information about the structure of the
shocks and in the absence of transaction costs,
the price level reflects current information
about money Money is neutral. Incomplete
information of some sort is a necessary
condition for significant monetary effects,
but it is not sufficient.
Lucas’ (1972) hypothesis about incom-
plete information restricts uncertainty to
misperception of current shocks; people do
not know whether a shock to demand is spe-
cific to their product or is a general increase
in demand. It is now generally recognized
that Lucas’ hypothesis produces a response
of real output to a nominal shock but does
not generate as much persistence as is found
in cyclical fluctuations of output and prices.
Persistence mustbe introduced. The problem
is to introduce persistence without introduc-
ing an implausible reason for neglecting
information in current output, prices, interest
rates and other variables.
In Brunner, Cukierman and Meltzer
(1983), a representative producer sets price
and output at the start of each period using
all available information at the time. This
includes, in particular, the variables in equa-
tion 1—inventory levels and changes, interest
rates and current policy When making price
and output decisions, producers are uncertacn
about the permanence of observed shocks.
As in the earlier discussion, they do not
respond to changes that are perceived to
be transitory.
Let x~’ and m* denote the perceived per-
manent components ofx and cm. Knowing
these values, producers set output and the
price level;y~’ and p’°denote the producers’
decisions. They are determined from a subset
of the system ofsimultaneous equations:
(2) ujYa*, Pr*, Ah,*, ~rr,1a*~r*,x’°,ma*] = 0.
The actual values are x and mm, but x - x’°and
mm - are ignored in adjusting prices and
output. Transitory changes are not innocuous.
With y~ and p’°adjusted tox~ and rn*, nomi-
nal and real interest rates and the change in
inventories adjust to the perceived transitory
changes, shown as equation 3:
(3) -RYr*, p~Ah0, hj~dr, ~a, ~~r’ mm,] = 0.
Output, inventories and other real values
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respond to both nominal and real shocksin
this model by amounts that depend on the
size of themisperception. As new information
arrives, producers revise their beliefs about
the permanence of shocks; p’°.y~’ and all other
variables adjust to the changed perception.
An econometrician examining the data
generated by this model would at times find
serially correlated changes in output and
serially correlated errors. Serial correlation
arises following a large permanent real or
nominal shock if the shock is believed for a
time to be transitory. As time passes, and
errors are repeated, perceptions adjust. Even
if the unconditional error in the population
is serially uncorrelated, misperception of the
permanence of shocks can lead producers to
make errors that, cx post, are serially correlat-
ed. A model of this kind may explain why
some researchers have found cx post real
effects ofanticipated changes in money See,
inter alios, Mishkin (1983).
Ahhough prices do not fully adjust to
shocks when they occur, decisions are entirely
rational. Producers use all available informa-
tion, but they misinterpret the nature of the
shock. Once they perceive that the shock is
permanent, prices and output fully reflect
the information.
The length ofthe recognition lag depends
on the relative variance ofpermanent and
transitory shocks. The larger the variance of
permanent shocks, relative to transitory
shocks, the shorter the recognition lag. If all
shocks were permanent, prices and output
wouldadjust top* andy* values assoon as the
shocks occurred. The lag in our model would
be one period, as in the Lucas model. If all
shocks are transitory y and p change, buty~
and p~’ never adjust.
In Keynesian models, inflexible prices
(or wages) and gradual adjustment are taken as
evidence ofdisequilibrium. The information
structure of the model here implies that this
inference is invalid. Buyers and sellers use
all available information and adjust to a
market equilibrium.
There are three types ofequilibrium.
At any moment, there is a permanent stock
equilibrium characterized by the statevariables
x* and m*. This equilibrium occurs when
= 0. The values ofall variables are adjusted
to the perceived permanent shocks and
the condition of unchanging inventories.
Each firmuses resources at the profit maxi-
mizing rate. No firm seeks to expand or
contract output or change its price and
inventoryposition.
A permanent equilibrium is less encom-
passing. The state variables in this case are
f, m~ and ~o’ All other variables adjust to
these conditions. Ifx” and rn* remain
unchanged, the permanent equilibrium
converges over time to the permanent
stock equilibrium.
A transitory equilibriuan imposes an
adjustment of the system to givenvalues,
mm nn*,x x*, y* p* and ~ao Inventory
adjustment and interest rate changes produce
the transitory short-run equilibrium.
In Brunner, Cukierman and Meltzer
(1983) we show how real variables respond
to monetary shocks in a model of this kind.
All expectations are rational. No information
is wasted once it is correctly perceived.
Misperceptions occur, so the system adjusts
sluggishly to information that, cx post, turns
out to be permanent. The discussion here,
following the original, uses inventories as a
representative real variable but the response
ofreal output is similar.
Figure 2 shows the adjustment path.
Asterisks denotes permanent values, and a
superscript a denotes actual values.
“Up to period t, the economy is at an
equilibrium: H = H~. During period t,
there is an unanticipated increase
in money growth. Interest rates
fall; with prices fixed for the period,
aggregate demand increases, and
inventories are reduced. Inability to
identify permanent shocks means that
the perceived value of cm changes as
information about the rate ofmonetary
expansion becomes available. Forecast
errorsremain on one side ofzero for
several periods. Forecast errors rein-
force the cyclical deviation of inventories.
A large permanent increase in money
growth, that is not immediately recog-
nized as permanent, increases twa,
and adds to the cyclical deviation
ofinventories.
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t+l HZ t+3 to5 time
An asterisk in the table indicates the expected path of inventories.
The outer envelopeshows the actual path.
“The reduction in inventories setsoff
a process of adjustment of output and
inventories. Thepath along which
inventories are expected to adjust at
the onsetof period t+1 is shown by the
positively sloped hne from ~ to
the permanent level ofinventories, Ha’.
Along this path, a typical firm plans to
produce output in excess of expected
sales and build inventories. The expected
value of inventories by the end of period
tel is shown as H0~2. If the monetary
shock is correctly perceived as transitory
and there are no further shocks, firms
adjust along the planned path and
achieve the values of inventories,
1~1
r +2’
in successive periods until the per-
manent value, Ha’, is restored.
“Suppose, however, that the increase
in money growth persists. In period t+2,
interest rates are again pushed below the
value expected for the period, and actual
inventories, H~,,are, again, below the
value expected, H,2, as shown in fig. 2.
At the beginning of period 1+2, firms
and households expect the economy to
adjust along the new path, from I~I~2
to W. The new path reflects all the
available information about the shocks,
including behefs about the permanence
of the change in money growth and
knowledge of the structural parame-
ters. . If the variance of the transitory
component ofmoney growth is large
relative to the variance of the permanent
component, adjustment to permanent
changes is relatively slow. Inventories
can fall below their expected value for
several periods and, thus, move away
from Ha’.
“Additional information about the per-
manence of the shock that first occurred
in period t is revealed each period, so the
path of adjustment toward Ha’ is not
smooth. As time passes, however, the
addition to information is small. After t+3
in fig. 2, inventories adjust toward H~’
unless another shock—another unantici-
pated increase in money growth—lowers
inventories and starts a new process of
learning and adjusting.
“Actual inventories follow the outer
envelope in fig. 2; expected inventories,
H, follow the adjustment paths that start
at the actual values for each period. The
figure shows principal features of our
model of inventory behavior, augmented
by the effect of permanent-transitory
confusion. Deviations from Ha’ are on
one side of Ha’ for several periods
because ofthe slow adjustment of inven-
tories. This feature occurs even if all
shocks are white noise. In addition,
information about the permanence of
shocks becomes available gradually
People use all information and their
beliefs about permanent values to
determine the adjustment path, but
they make unavoidable errors because
they learn about the permanence of
shocks gradually”
SUMMARY
My emphasis in this section is on micro-
foundations that lead to price setting and
to gradual adjustment. Id onot claim to
have uncovered a unique structure that
produces sticky prices under rational behavior.
There are many reasons and many valid
hypotheses that make both price setting and
gradual price adjustment compatible with
rational behavior.
Price setting is sufficient for real effects
of monetary shocks. I have discussed several







reasons for pricesetting—menu costs,
Knight’s uncertainty argument for the
existence of firms, producers’ desire to
signalquality, purchasers’ gains from
lower cost of information and bargaining,
and other differences in costs ofacquir-
ing information.
In principle, sellers or buyers could
set relative, not absolute, prices. To do
so efficiently, buyers and sellers have to
agree on an index. Price index numbers
are subject to real and nominal shocks that
are sometimes permanent, sometimes
transitory, and sometimes alter the rate of
price change persistently If these shocks
could be correctly identified cx post, and
if their expected duration were known, the
parties might agree to adjust prices after
shocks occur. Far more often, cx post
adjustment is done by negotiation, or
the parties agree to partial indexation and
negotiate about the remainder. These
arrangements are consistent with the presence
of relatively large costs of acquiringinforma-
tion and agreeing on what has occurred,
whether the change is permanent or transitory
and how long and how large future price
changes will he. Among these costs are the
costs associated with moral hazard if one
party controls relevant data.
Economic contractions typically last
nine months to one year. Considerable
evidence suggests that price changes may
lag as much as two years behind monetary
shocks. To yield the patterns ofprice and
output change observed in actual cconocnics,
price setting must be joined to a rational
reason for persistence.
Permanent-transitory confusion—uncer-
tainty about the duration or persistence
of shocks—provides one such condition.
Under this hypothesis, lags can be long or
short and cx post errors can be serially
correlated, if a large permanent shock is
perceived as transitory If the variance of
he permanent shocks is high relative to the
variance of transitory shocks, the lag is
relatively short, and there is no reason for
significant serial correlation to he observed
cx post. in this case, price setters believe
that most shocks are permanent, so they
adjust promptly
avmwe~awr aM







We cannot directly observe how people
decide on the degree of persistence in the
rate ofinflation (or other variables). However,
we can measure some ofthe errors that
contribute to permanent-transitory confusion
and use econometric methods to estimate the
variance of permanent and transitory errors
in the price level (or other variables). This
section considers these sources ofevidence
on the relative size of permanent and
transitory changes.
Bullard (1994) reported the size ofrevi-
sions to quarterly reports of the rate of change
of the GNP deflator for theyears 1986 through
1992. He found that the mean revision for
the 28 quarters was positive in this period;
early reports understated the rate ofinflation
and later revisions added additional amounts.
Bullard also reports the range ofrevisions for
each of the four quarters following the period
considered, Thereported ranges exclude the
most extreme 5 percent of the revisions in
each tail, Table I reproduces Bullard’s results,
The average rate of inflation for the period
is approximately 3 percent. The range of
revisions (excluding extreme values) is 2.3 to
2.9 percentage points. The revisions are from
70 percent to 130 percent of the (3 percent)
average reported change. Therelatively large
size ofthe revisions suggests that it is rational
for the public to act as if the initial announce-
ment is a very noisyindicator of the true rate
ofinflation,
In several papers summarized in
Brunner and Meltzcr (1993), we report
forecast errors for the rate ofchange ofoutput
or inflation using different models, methods
of forecast and countries. The forecasting
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methods include state-of-the-art econometric
modeling, time-series analysis, judgment and
combinations of these methods. A
rule-of-thumb summary is that mean
absolute errors for output growth in the
major industrial countries is 50 percent or
more of the average rate of change one
quarter or one year ahead, Inflation is less
variable than output over short periods, and
its forecast error is a smallerfraction of the
average rate of change. Still, errors in hoth
growth and inflation forecasts are large.
The data on forecast errors make a
persuasive case that forecasters frequently
misperceive future values, Data on revisions
suggest that current reports arc subject
to large errors. Errors maybe unbiased,
but that is a small consolation for those
who adjust to events that are found later
not to have occurred or those who do not
adjust to changes that did occur. The
permanent-transitory distinction implies that
partial adjustment is opthmal. Ex post, it will
seem that adjustment hasbeen sluggish.
Indeed, as noted, errors may appear to be
serially correlated following large changes.
A filter canbe used to separate permna-
ncnt and transitory components! Let the
error term in an aggregate such as the price





where p and rdenote the two components.
The transitory component is white noise,
The permanent component has the property
of zero mean and constant variance, ca’2,
At any time t, the expected change in the
permanent component is zero.
People observe prices and output. As in
the model of the previous section, they cannot
separate the levels or changes of the permanent
or transitory components. The rate at which
they adjust depends on the relative variances
of the transitory and permanent components
of inflation or output growth. The larger the
variance ofthe permanent component relative
to the variance of the transitory component,
the quicker the economy adjusts to permanent
changes. A relatively large transitory variance
slows the response.
Meltzer (1986) estimated the variances
of the permanent and transitory components
ofinflation and growth for Canada, Germany
the United Kingdom, and the United States
under fixed and fluctuating exchange rates.
The fixed exchange rate period runs from the
first quarter of 1960 through the third quarter
of 1971. Fluctuating rates begin in the fourth
quarter of 1971 and end in the fourth quarter
of 1984,8
Table 2 shows the ratios computed from
these data using the adjustment equations in
Muth (1960). The estimated variance ratios
for inflation and growth changed under fluc-
tuating rates, but the direction ofchange is
not uniform across countries. The length of
the adjustment lag required to distinguish
permanent from transitory shocks changed
much less. For inflation, seven of the eight
values of the adjustment lag (A) lie between
0.41 and 0.56. These values imply that, con-
sistent with Blinder’s survey data, about half
ofthe shock to inflation is seen in the current
quarter. Between 82 percent and 96 percent
of the adjustment of permanent inflation
occurs within four quarters ofthe initial
shock to the inflation rate. This adjustment
is faster than the two-year average lag com-
monly suggested. For real growth, seven of
the eightvalues ofA lie between 0.45 and
0.67; within four quarters, 91 percent to 99
percent ofthe adjustment occurs. The speed
of output adjustment is broadly consistent
with the length of post-war recessions if
these recessions arc interpreted as the cuanu-
lative adjustment set off by a monetary or
real shock. Inflation adjusts more slowly
than growth as many studies have shown.
Clarida and Gali (1994) studied
the response of real exchange rates to nominal
shocks in four countries. For Canada and the
United Kingdom, they were unable to find
any structural effects—real or nominal—on
real exchange rates.
For Germany and Japan, the evidence
suggests that nominal shocks explain
45 percent and 34 percent, respectively of
the four-quarter-ahead forecast error variances
of the log level of bilateral real dollar exchange
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rates. Clarida and Gali note that their
estimates are consistent with the evidence
from vector autoregressions reported in
Eichcnbaum and Evans (1992).
Clarida and Gali (1994) use a trivariate
vector autoregression to estimate the transi-
tory component ofreal exchange rates.°
Their model includes shocks to aggregate
demand and supply The authors report the
ratio ofthe variance of transitory shocks to
the variance of actual shocks. Using their
data, we can compute the ratio of the variance
of permanent shocks to the variance of tran-
sitory shocks. The ratio covers a wide range
in these countries—from 0.42 in Germany to
3.76 in Canada. These findings suggest that
most shocks to the Canadian real exchange
rate have been permanent while most shocks
to the German real exchange rate were tran-
sitory Hence, the Canadian real exchange
rate should adjust more rapidly to shocks
than the German real rate.
Meltzer (1993) used the permanent-
transitory distinction to model the U.S.
multilateral real exchange rate. Forboth levels
and first differences under fixed and fluctuat-
ing rates from 1960 to 1991, the data suggest
that there is a large permanent component in
the change of the real exchange rate and a
significant transitory component. Further,
the data suggest that the multilateral real
exchange rate responds to changes in the
nominal stock ofmoney The effect eventually
vanishes, but monetary changes have real
effects until prices adjust. These findings are
consistent with short-run non-neutrality and
long-run neutrality of money if permanent
changes in money were perceived as transitory
at the time they occurred or conversely
The studies of prices, output and
exchange rates support the principal
arguments of the article. They are only a
small part of the evidence supporting cx
post, short-run non-neutrality They arc of
interest because they attribute slow adjust-
ment ofnominal values and real effects of
nominal shocks to the difficulty of discerning
the persistence of shocks. With a non-trivial
cost of acquiring information, price setting
and permanent-transitory confusion imply
that nominal changes have real effects that
persist for a time.
Relative Variances ofthe Permanent and
Transitory Components
196041
Canada Germany IlK. US.
Other recent studies find evidence
of costs ofacquiring information.
Investors frequently pay a premium to buy
country-specific mutual funds. The premium
implies that they could buy the individual
securities at lower cost. If they are uncertain
about which securities to buy and when to
buy or sell, it may he rational to pay for the
services of traderswho specialize in the
particular market,
Smith (1991) uses costs ofacquiring
information as one reason for the absence
of optimal portfoho diversification ofworld
market securities. The degree of diversifica-
thou depends on costs ofacquiring information,
People know much more about values and
earnings in their own market than in foreign
markets, Prices in foreign markets may reflect
full information, but some investors either
do not have this information or cannot assess
whether changes are permanent. Hence,
they do not respond promptly to information
about each of these markets. They do not
hold the “true” equilibrium portfolio they
would hold if information costs were zero.
A principal cost in this case, as in others, is
the interpretation of available information.
Permanent-transitory confusion is one part
of the interpretation problem.
In Fuhrer and Moore (1993), the inflation
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rate is sticky. Firms adjust relative prices to
the average of other sectors’ expected
relative prices over the hfc ofexisting
contracts, Firms also adjust for the
current and expected level of output. The
autocorrelation functions based on their
model have very similar shapes to the auto-
correlations generated by an unconstrained
vector autoregression. In particular, they
show considerable persistence in inflation
and output movements and sustained
effects ofinflation on real output. In short,
Fuhrer and Moore provide evidence that is
consistent with a model in which there arc
costs of learning about the permanence or
persistence of changes, and in which
people adopt strategies that leave room
for misperception and real effects of
nominal changes.
Earlier work by Boschen and
Grossman (1982), Gordon (1982) and
Mishkin (1983) also provide evidence
that supports stickyprices. Indeed, the
evidence of gradual adjustment ofprices
and of short-term real effects of monetary
change is common, These studies lack
micro-foundations, Price-settingin part of
the economy and permanent-transitory
confusion, as in Brunner, Cukierman and
Meltzer (1983), reconciles this evidence
with rational behavior.
CONcLUSiON
The examples in the preceding section
are a small part of the recently accumulated
evidence showing that there is much more
than casual observation to support the main
propositions in this paper: Nominal prices
adjust with a lag. The lag is sufficiently
long that real variables respond to nominal
changes. Costs ofacquiring information
about the persistence of observed changes—
permanent-transitory confusion—is a main
component ofthe cost and a main reason
for the lag. Even where prices reflect infor-
mation fully, all individuals or firms may
not have adjusted fully to available but
costly information,
The oft-repeated comment that
macroeconomics should he built on
micro-foundations is correct if and only
if the micro-foundations are appropriate for
the task. Standard micro theory, such as
Arrow-Debreu, imposes complete markets
and market clearing in each market. There
is no role for monetary disturbances. This is
not the appropriate micro-foundation for
macroeconomics. No amount of squeezing,
cutting and pasting will make it so.
Rational behavior and rational expecta-
tions are entirely consistentwith costs of
acquiringinformation and the inability to
fully identify permanent and transitory
shocks eitherwhen they occur or for several
quarters after. Indeed, Muth’s (1961) initial
formulation of rational expectations is based
on the latter distinction,
One alternative explanation of sticky
prices in recent literature relies on menu
costs and imperfect competition. This expla-
nation is a foundation for the so-called
L-shaped supply curve famihar from Keynesian
theories, I show that the evidence in
Blinder’s (1991) survey rejects the L-shapcd
supply curve. Further, the implications of
monopolistic competition, such aswidespread
excess capacity do not explain gradual price
adjustment in most service industries.
Gordon (1990) proposes a disaggregared
system to take account ofthe information at
many levels of the economy He argues that
prices respond to marginal cost but that mar-
ginal cost for any firm depends on the pricing
strategy of its suppliers. Hence, such infor-
mation enters firms’ decisions about price
and output adjustment. Information from
macrodata is much less relevant.
This argument captures some of the
dynamics ofpricing, but it poses unresolved
challenges for aggregation over different
industry structures. Moreover, Gordon’s
framework imphes that commodity producers
should adjust slowly to aggregate shocks and
that large firms in durable goods industries
should adjust promptly The stylized facts
suggest that the opposite is true. One reason
is that organized commodity markets increase
the information available to commodity pro-
ducers. There are no comparable markets for
consumers’ and producers’ durable goods out-
put. Differences in information and the costs
of acquiring information are consistent with
the stylized facts on speed ofadjustment.
FEDEEAL RESERYR BANK OF ST. LOUIS
116II FYIF~
MAY/JUNE 1995
The micro-foundations suggested in this
article use costs ofacquiring information to
explain three common observations. First,
many prices are set. Second, price setters
choose nominal values. Third, the daily week-
ly monthly or quarterly variances of “set
prices” are small fractions of the variance of
prices in auction markets; set prices are stickier.
Households and firms do not operate in
a world offull information. Incomplete infor-
mation and costs of acquiring information are
central problems of a monetary economy
Information and transaction costs explain why
people hold and use money as a medium of
exchange (Brunner and Meltzer, 1971). There
is considerable evidence that these costs are
not tnvtal. Thearticle cites revisions to report-
ed data, forecast errors, incomplete informa-
tion about costs, profits and strategies of
competing firms. These examples do not
exhaust the costs that firms and individuals
face.
Some of these costs can be reduced by
institutional and contractual arrangements.
The arrangements that people choose may
be optimal when contracts are written but,
with changes in the environment, there are
unforeseen gains and losses. If the gains and
lossesare transitory, their expected value is
zero, It may not be worthwhile to change the
contract or the method of contracting. Once
thechange is considered persistent, gains and
losses are expected to cumulate. Adjustment
or re-negotiation becomes more appealing to
at least one party
Information about permanent and tran-
sitory changes in profits, prices, wages and
other variables is costly to acquire. The
distribution of shocks between real and
nominal, permanent and transitory may differ
from one sample period to the next, People
learn to monitor events or changes that are
costly to ignore. But learning requires a
continuous process of monitoring both what
has happened and what should he observed.
This is a basic problem for firms and house-
holds. As such, it is a more appropriate
micro-foundation for macroeconomics,
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